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The standard framework for modeling the mental qualities of conscious experi-
ences represents mental qualities as points in multidimensional spaces, where distances 
between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This paper 
argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new 
framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem is that the standard 
framework cannot capture precision structure: for example, consider the phenomenal 
contrast between seeing an object as crimson in foveal vision versus merely as red in 
peripheral vision. The solution I favor is to model mental qualities using regions, rather 
than points. I explain how this seemingly simple formal innovation not only provides a 
natural way of modeling precision, but also yields a variety of further theoretical fruits: 
it enables us to formulate novel hypotheses about the space and structures of mental 
qualities, formally differentiate two dimensions of phenomenal similarity, generate a 
quantitative model of the phenomenal sorites, and deploy a new theoretical tool in the 
empirical investigation of consciousness. A noteworthy consequence of my new frame-
work is that the structure of the mental qualities of conscious experiences is fundamen-
tally different from the structure of the perceptible qualities of external objects. 
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Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those 
involved in feeling pain, seeing red, or smelling cinnamon. The standard approach 
to modeling mental qualities is to target a particular domain, such as color experi-
ence, and to develop a quality-space model for that domain. These models represent 
mental qualities via points in multidimensional spaces, where points that lie closer 
in the space correspond to mental qualities that are more similar to each other. For 
example, in the canonical three-dimensional model of color qualities, any particular 
color quality can be specified via its values along the hue, saturation and brightness 
dimensions, and color qualities that are more similar correspond to points closer in 
the space. The result is a systematic model of the structure of color experience. 
This framework for modeling mental qualities is highly promising, since 
every domain of mental qualities is structured by similarity relations. While the 
model for color qualities is the most developed, in recent years quality-space models 
have also been proposed for pain, temporal experience, auditory experience, and 
olfactory experience. And even domains of experience that are difficult to empiri-
cally investigate, such as emotional or cognitive experience, arguably could be mod-
eled in such a way if only we knew the relevant structural facts. If we wish to map 
the structures of conscious experiences, it seems a significant part of the project will 
consist in constructing quality-space models across different experiential domains.1 
This paper (1) argues that this standard framework is structurally inade-
quate, and (2) develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The 
core issue for the standard framework is that it cannot capture what I call precision 
structure. Consider, for example, the phenomenal contrast between seeing an object 
in foveal vision as crimson versus seeing an object in peripheral vision merely as red 
(rather than as any particular shade of red): in such a case, your foveal visual expe-
rience is more precise than your peripheral visual experience. The problem for the 
standard framework is that imprecise qualities do not correspond to individual 
points within the standard models. Though this may at first appear to be a minor 
 
1 See Churchland [2005] on color experience, Klincewicz [2011] on temporal experience, Kos-
tic [2014] on pain, Renero [2014] on auditory experience, and Young, Keller, & Rosenthal 
[2014] on olfactory experience. See Clark [2000] and Rosenthal [2010, 2015] for general dis-
cussions of the quality-space model framework. 





technical challenge, solving the problem has significant philosophical and method-
ological ramifications. 
 The basic idea behind my new framework is to model mental qualities using 
regions (rather than points) in multidimensional spaces. This seemingly simple in-
novation not only provides a natural way of capturing imprecise experiences, but 
also yields a variety of other philosophical fruits. In particular, my new framework 
enables us to formulate novel hypotheses about the space and structure of mental 
qualities, formally differentiate two dimensions of phenomenal similarity, generate 
a quantitative model of the phenomenal sorites, and deploy a new theoretical tool 
for the empirical investigation of consciousness. 
A core lesson of this paper is that precision is much more significant for un-
derstanding the structure of experience than has been previously appreciated. On 
the picture I develop, precision is a structural feature of experience, akin to similarity 
and magnitude. A noteworthy consequence of my new framework is that the struc-
ture of the mental qualities of conscious experiences is fundamentally different from 
the structure of the perceptible qualities of external objects: only mental qualities 
have precision structure. This subverts the common assumption that the structure 
of the mental qualities of conscious experiences is isomorphic to the structure of the 
perceptible qualities of external objects. 
Alongside my philosophical aims, a methodological goal of this paper is to 
illustrate the prospects for formal phenomenology, or the application of formal tools to 
the study of conscious experiences. Conscious experiences are richly structured, yet 
there is relatively little work that attempts to capture that structure using formal 
models.2 This paper aims to exhibit why such an endeavor is a promising means of 
advancing consciousness research. 
§1 explains what precision is and why it poses a problem for standard mod-
els of mental qualities; §2 develops my new framework for modeling mental quali-
ties, which I call the regional framework; §3 discusses applications of the regional 
framework to issues concerning discriminatory grain, empirical methodology, and 
probabilistic interpretations of precision. 
 
 
2 For some other examples of recent work applying formal tools to consciousness research, 
see Tononi [2007], Prentner [2019], and Kleiner [2020]. 





§ 1 | The Standard Framework 
Let me begin by providing a brief overview of quality-space models. After 
that, I will explain what imprecise qualities are and why they pose a problem for 
standard quality-space models. 
 
Quality-Space Models 
A quality-space model is a model of a set of qualities and the relations between 
them.3 The standard approach to modeling mental qualities is to represent qualities 
via points in multidimensional spaces. Under this approach, a quality-space model 
aims to represent every quality of a given domain so that there is one-to-one corre-
spondence between qualities of the domain and points in the model and so that 
qualities that are more similar are represented by points that are less distant in the 
model.4 As an example, a quality-space model for colors represents particular colors 
via points in a three-dimensional space such that points that are closer in the space 
represent colors that are more similar to each other. 
Quality-space models can be developed for either the mental qualities of 
conscious experiences (such as phenomenal red) or the perceptible qualities of ex-
ternal objects (such as red).5 But the focus of this paper is solely on mental qualities. 
As I discuss later, precision is not a property of perceptible qualities, so the frame-
work I develop is inapplicable to perceptible qualities. For the rest of the paper, 
whenever I use the term ‘quality’ without qualification I will mean mental qualities. 
 
3 There is often ambiguity between talking about the formal representation of a domain of 
qualities and the domain of qualities itself: for example, consider Clark [2000]’s characteriza-
tion of a quality-space as an “ordering of the qualities presented by a sensory modality in 
which relative similarities among those qualities are represented by their relative distances.” 
To disambiguate, I will always use ‘quality-space’ to mean the domain of qualities and ‘qual-
ity-space model’ to mean the formal representation of those qualities. 
4 Quality-space models often aim to also capture magnitude relations, such that higher mag-
nitudes of quantities are represented by higher values along the dimensions of the model 
(e.g., if color quality a is brighter than color quality b, then a has a higher value along the 
brightness dimension than b). To simplify the exposition, I focus mainly on similarity. 
5 See Byrne [2011] for more on the distinctions between different kinds of qualities. 





And for brevity, I will use terms such as ‘hue’ rather than ‘phenomenal hue’ to des-
ignate the dimensions of mental qualities. 
I take for granted that conscious experiences are characterized by mental 
qualities, meaning that what it is like to undergo a conscious experience is partly 
constituted by which mental qualities are instantiated by that conscious experience. 
Otherwise, I will be neutral on most questions about the nature of mental qualities. 
In particular, I remain neutral on whether mental qualities can be instantiated even 
in the absence of consciousness, on issues about the metaphysical relationship be-
tween mental qualities and perceptible qualities (such as issues about which theory 
of perception is correct), and on whether mental qualities are physical in nature. 
Staying neutral on these issues increases the generality of my framework, in that the 
framework will be compatible with a wide variety of philosophical positions. 
The target of this paper is the standard framework for modeling mental qual-
ities, rather than any particular model within that framework. A model is a formal 
representation of a particular domain of qualities, whereas a framework is a general 
schema for developing models. In order to construct a model for any particular do-
main of experience (such as color qualities), we must empirically investigate the rel-
evant domain. But in order to develop an adequate framework, we must specify 
what kind of formal structure is required for modeling any arbitrary domain of men-
tal qualities, regardless of how any particular model is structured. I will eventually 
argue that in order to capture the precision structure of mental qualities, we must 
make fundamental changes to the whole quality-space model framework (rather 
than just revisions to particular models). In §3, I will discuss how empirical methods 
can be used to construct models within my new framework. 
There is a diverse body of literature in both cognitive science and philosophy 
pertaining to the modeling of mental qualities. The relevant cognitive science litera-
ture has focused mainly on issues concerning the psychophysical relations between 
physical stimuli and mental qualities and the challenges in measuring mental qual-
ities.6 The relevant philosophical literature has focused mainly on questions about 
 
6 For a classic text in psychophysics, see Fechner [1860]. For more recent overviews of psy-
chophysics, see Murray [1993] and Gescheider [1997]. For an overview of the application of 
measurement theory to psychological models, see Luce & Krumhansl [1988]. For discussion 





the relationship between mental qualities and perceptible qualities and the individ-
uation of mental qualities.7 However, in both disciplines, research that directly ad-
dresses the modeling of mental qualities tends to focus on similarity structure, leav-
ing out precision structure. 
This lacuna is likely due to the common assumption that models of mental 
qualities are isomorphic to models of perceptible qualities. The standard methodol-
ogy for constructing a model of mental qualities is to first use data concerning per-
ceptual similarity (or discrimination or ordering) judgments to construct a model of 
perceptible qualities, and to then extrapolate from that to a model of mental quali-
ties. The justification is that mental qualities can be individuated by their perceptual 
roles: in particular, it seems that subjects make perceptual discriminations between 
physical stimuli only on the basis of being in mental states with different mental 
qualities. Since perceptible qualities (as opposed to physical stimuli)8 are also indi-
viduated by subjects’ perceptual discriminatory capacities, this suggests that the 
structure of mental quality-spaces is isomorphic to the structure of perceptible qual-
ity-spaces.9 I will eventually argue that this isomorphism thesis is false: models of 
mental qualities require more structure than models of perceptible qualities. 
For the rest of the paper, I will call the approach to modeling mental qualities 
outlined above the standard framework, and I will call any particular model within 
 
of models of color qualities in particular, see Logvinenko [2015]. For an approach to geomet-
rically modeling concepts that shares some (though not all) formal features with my frame-
work, see Gärdenfors [2014]. 
7 For some classic and contemporary philosophical texts addressing these questions, see 
Goodman [1954] and Clark [2000], Rosenthal [2000, 2015]. For discussion of the role of phe-
nomenology in psychophysical theorizing, see Horst [2005]. For recent discussions of the na-
ture of phenomenal qualities, see Coates & Coleman [2015]. 
8 Perceptible qualities (e.g., colors) should be distinguished from physical stimuli (e.g., spe-
cific wavelengths of light): only the former are held to be isomorphic to mental qualities. See 
Clark [2000] for more on this distinction. 
9 As examples, Sellars [1963] talks of an “isomorphism of acts of sense and material things,” 
Churchland [2007] talks of a “homomorphism” from the space of objective colors to “the 
internal structure of human phenomenological color space,” and Rosenthal [2016] talks of 
extrapolating “from the quality space of perceptual discriminations to an isomorphic quality 
space of the mental qualities that enable those discriminations.” 





that framework a standard model. More specifically, we can think of standard models 
as formally specifiable via a set of points (representing individual qualities) and a 
distance metric (where distances between points are inversely correlated with de-
grees of similarity between the qualities represented by those points). In what fol-
lows, I will explain why the standard framework is structurally inadequate. 
 
Imprecise Experiences 
Consider your color experience in foveal vision versus in peripheral vision. 
In foveal vision, you see an object as a specific shade of red, such as crimson. But in 
peripheral vision, you no longer see it as any specific shade of red, but instead just 
as red. It is not merely that you see the object as a different specific shade of red 
across the two cases. Instead, even if your peripheral color experience represents its 
object as having some specific shade of red or other, it leaves open which shade of red 
that might be, and it is compatible with your peripheral color experience that you 
are seeing any given shade of red within a certain range.10 Speaking somewhat met-
aphorically, peripheral color experience is less sharp and crisp than foveal color ex-
perience. This difference in phenomenal character is what I call precision.11 
Though I will focus on precision with respect to color experience across fo-
veal and peripheral vision, there are other examples that may also be used to illus-
trate the phenomenon. For example, consider the contrast between your color expe-
rience of an object that is far away versus nearby, your spatial visual experience with 
vision correction lenses versus without vision correction, or your tactile experience 
touching a texture with your fingertips versus touching a texture with your back. In 
each case, the former experience is more precise than the latter. 
Precision is different in kind from familiar phenomenal properties such as 
hue, loudness, or painfulness. Those phenomenal properties correspond to dimen-
sions of quality-space models. But as we will see, precision cannot be captured in 
the same way (at least not without making substantive theoretical assumptions). As 
 
10 See Hansen, Prajecus, & Gegenfurtner [2009] for psychophysical evidence of this contrast. 
See Strasburger et al [2011] for a recent review of the science of peripheral vision. 
11 I take the term ‘precision’ from Block [2015]. A number of philosophers have used the 
terms ‘determinacy’ or ‘determinability’ for what I call ‘precision’, but I will later explain 
why ‘precision’ is better. 





some initial evidence for this, consider how a visual experience could (arguably) be 
precise with respect to color yet imprecise with respect to shape or how qualities 
even across different modalities can be similar with respect to precision. Instead of 
thinking of precision as merely another phenomenal dimension, it is more apt to 
think of precision as a structural feature of experience (like similarity or magnitude). 
This hints at why modeling precision requires modifying the entire quality-space 
model framework rather than just patching up particular models.12 
Questions about the nature of precision depend on more fundamental issues 
in the philosophy of perception. For representationalists, it is natural to think that 
precision is a matter of the granularity of the representational content of an experi-
ence. For naïve realists, it is natural to think that precision is a matter of being per-
ceptually acquainted with more determinate properties of external objects. For qua-
lia theorists, it is natural to think that precision is a structural property of phenome-
nal character somewhat akin to the resolution of an image. Since the quality-space 
model framework is largely theory neutral, the issues discussed in this paper will 
be relevant to theorists across the board. At times I will talk of mental qualities rep-
resenting perceptible qualities, but my discussion could likewise be framed in terms 
of other relations (such as perceptual acquaintance or causal correspondence).13 
There is a mix of literature across both cognitive science and philosophy per-
taining to imprecise qualities. In cognitive science, this includes research on percep-
tual discrimination capacities (such as spatial resolution and tactile discrimination), 
on how attention affects perceptual discrimination, and on the neurophysiological 
properties underlying these differences.14 However, these discussions tend to focus 
 
12 Notably, Block [2015] says that the notion of “phenomenal precision [is] obscure…we have 
a well-developed science of perception but very little science of the phenomenology of per-
ception.” This paper aims to help bridge this gap. 
13 For a general overview of theories of perception, see Crane & French [2017]. For argument 
against representationalism about precision, see Block [2015]. For argument against naïve 
realism about precision, see Cutter [2019]. 
14 See Intriligator & Cavanagh [2001] and Block [2012] on the relationship between visual 
resolution and visual attention, Anton-Erxleben & Carrasco [2013] on attention, spatial reso-
lution and the role of receptor cell density for perceptual discrimination, Bruns et al [2014] 
on tactile spatial resolution, Debats et al [2012] on measuring haptic precision, Denison 





on perceptual capacities and their functional roles, rather than the structure of the 
mental qualities associated with those perceptual capacities. In philosophy, there 
has been recent work examining imprecise qualities in connection with philosophi-
cal theories of perception, generic phenomenology, and the representational con-
tents of experience.15 However, these discussions have not directly addressed how 
precision structure relates to similarity structure or how to integrate imprecise qual-
ities into the quality-space model framework. 
 
Precision vs. Determinability vs. Noise 
Before explaining why precision poses a problem for the standard frame-
work, I need to first address two conceptual traps in thinking about precision. In 
what follows, I explain why precision is conceptually distinct from two other phe-
nomena: namely, determinability and noise. 
Let us start with determinability, or the relation between determinates and 
determinables. A determinate is a way for a determinable to be instantiated, and 
determinables may be thought of as disjunctions of determinates. To see why preci-
sion and determinability are independent, consider the maximally determinate phe-
nomenal property characterizing the particular peripheral color experience you are 
currently undergoing. That property is maximally determinate since there is only 
one way for that property to be instantiated, but it is also imprecise since it does not 
represent any specific shade of color. Conversely, consider the determinable phe-
nomenal property that has as determinates the precise color phenomenal properties 
characterizing your foveal visual experiences when looking at a series of color chips 
in optimal conditions. That property is determinable since there are multiple ways 
for that property to be instantiated but each of its determinates is precise since they 
all represent specific shades of color. Since there are both maximally determinate 
 
[2017] on precision in relation to perceptual uncertainty, and Gescheider [1997] for an over-
view of the role of perceptual discrimination thresholds in psychophysics. 
15 See Block [2015] and Cutter [2019] on precision’s implications for the nature of perception, 
Fink [2015] and Fazekas & Overgaard [2018] on precision in relation to generic phenomenol-
ogy and empirical methods for investigating consciousness, Stazicker [2011], Morrison 
[2016], Munton [2016], and Nanay [forthcoming] on the relation between precision and rep-
resentation, and Hellie [2005] and Pelling [2008] on precision and perceptual discrimination. 





imprecise phenomenal properties and determinable phenomenal properties with 
only precise determinates, precision and determinability are doubly dissociable. 
Precision and determinability are liable to be confused because of systematic 
ambiguities in natural language. For example, ‘phenomenal red’ can mean either a 
determinable phenomenal property that has precise determinates (e.g., the disjunc-
tion of phenomenal crimson, phenomenal scarlet, etc.) or a determinate phenomenal 
property that is imprecise. The risk of confusing precision and determinability is 
also due to the fact that precision of mental qualities is inversely correlated with 
determinability of the perceptible qualities represented by those mental qualities: 
for example, the determinate crimson is represented by a precise red experience 
whereas the determinable red is represented by an imprecise red experience.16 
These conceptual distinctions are worth highlighting, for taking precision to 
be merely a matter of determinability masks the importance of precision for under-
standing the structure of experience. Developing a model of determinable phenom-
enal properties would not be particularly interesting, since questions about which 
determinable properties there could be are somewhat analogous to questions about 
which disjunctive properties there could be. By contrast, we will soon address a va-
riety of philosophically substantive questions about the space and structure of im-
precise qualities, the implications of precision for phenomenal similarity, how pre-
cision relates to the nature of discriminability and the empirical investigation of con-
sciousness, and how precision challenges the thesis that mental quality-spaces are 
isomorphic to perceptible quality-spaces. 
At this point, some might suggest the rather radical hypothesis that impre-
cise qualities involve the instantiation of a determinable without the instantiation of 
any of its determinates.17 But even if this view were correct about the metaphysics, 
it would still be important to conceptually distinguish precision from determinabil-
ity. Otherwise, not only would there be systematic terminological ambiguities of the 
kind mentioned above, but we would not even have the concepts needed to resolve 
those ambiguities. Consider, for example, the claim that an experience instantiates 
the determinable phenomenal red. On this view, that claim could mean either that 
 
16 Note that representationalism does not undermine my point, since the property of repre-
senting a determinable property need not itself be a determinable property. 
17 See Wilson [2013] for a general defense of this metaphysical view. 





the experience is precise and instantiates one amongst many determinate phenom-
enal properties or it could mean that the experience is imprecise and instantiates the 
determinable phenomenal red (without instantiating any of its determinates). This 
means that no matter what view one favors about the metaphysics of precision, one 
ought to be sensitive to the distinction between precision and determinability.18 
Let us turn now to noise, or the degree of random variation within a psycho-
physical channel. A psychophysical channel is a causal pathway connecting a stimu-
lus (such as a color chip) to a signal (such as a color experience). The noisier a 
channel, the less the channel’s source determines its signal.19 A hypothesis that some 
might find attractive is that precision is simply the phenomenal manifestation of 
psychophysical noise.20 Though this is an interesting empirical hypothesis, it is im-
portant to appreciate why precision and noise are at least conceptually distinct. 
Suppose Aya’s color perception system stochastically generates one of a 
number of precise color experiences upon detection of a color. If Aya looks at a scar-
let color chip ten times, she might first have a scarlet experience, then a crimson 
experience, then a vermillion experience, and so forth. Aya’s color experiences are 
precise yet result from noisy psychophysical processes. Conversely, suppose Beto 
lacks foveal vision but otherwise has an extremely reliable color perception system. 
If Beto looks at a scarlet color chip ten times, then he has the exact same color expe-
rience every single time, but that color experience is the same as the one you would 
have when looking at the scarlet chip via peripheral vision. Beto’s color experiences 
are imprecise yet result from unnoisy psychophysical processes. 
In psychophysics, measurement theory, and related fields, the term ‘preci-
sion’ refers to the reciprocal of the degree of variance in a set of measurements, 
which does in fact vary inversely with noise. But statistical precision (the statistical 
property of measurements just defined) is distinct from phenomenal precision (the 
 
18 Imprecision is also sometimes characterized as vagueness. For brevity, I will simply note 
that vagueness is typically understood as a property of terms or concepts whereas impreci-
sion is a property of phenomenal properties or experiences, that terms and concepts for im-
precise qualities can be sharp, and that none of the theories of precision mentioned previ-
ously appeal to vagueness. For an overview of vagueness, see Williamson [1994]. 
19 See Gescheider [1997] for a classic text on psychophysics. See Dretske [1981] for a philo-
sophical discussion of noise from the perspective of information theory. 
20 See Hellie [2005] for an example of this kind of view. 





phenomenal property of mental qualities this paper focuses on). As an analogy, im-
agine a gun firing a round of bullets at a target: statistical precision corresponds to 
how closely clustered the bullet holes are to each other, whereas phenomenal preci-
sion (inversely) corresponds to the surface area of the bullet holes. These structural 
differences hint at the formal treatment of precision that will come later. 
Although precision and noise are conceptually distinct, it is empirically pos-
sible that imprecise mental qualities result from noisy psychophysical processes. 
Suppose our cognitive systems are structured so that whenever a psychophysical 
channel is noisy (prior to the generation of an experience), it reliably generates an 
imprecise mental quality (rather than stochastically generates a precise mental qual-
ity). For example, suppose you see a scarlet color chip, but the noise in your color 
perception system renders it uncertain whether the chip is scarlet or vermillion or 
crimson, so your color perception system generates a red experience. If such a hy-
pothesis is correct, then imprecise mental qualities would be the phenomenal man-
ifestation of noise (though as a matter of empirical fact, rather than conceptual ne-
cessity).21  For the purposes of this paper, I will stay neutral on this hypothesis. 
Though resolving the issue would provide us with a richer picture of the psycho-
physical processes resulting in imprecise experiences, it would still leave open how 
to best model imprecise mental qualities using the quality-space model framework. 
 
The Problem of Precision 
We are now in position to see why standard models cannot capture preci-
sion. The core problem is that in the standard framework, individual qualities are 
represented by individual points in quality-space models, but no individual points 
in such models are adequate for representing imprecise qualities. Putting it another 
way, the standard framework takes mental qualities to be specifiable by a single 
 
21 At first pass, it may seem that in such a scenario the source (i.e., the scarlet color chip) 
reliably determines the signal (i.e., the red mental quality), which suggests that the psycho-
physical process as a whole is unnoisy. But as we will see in the next section, there are many 
different red mental qualities, and which imprecise red experience is generated may depend 
on random variation in the psychophysical channel (rather than merely the source). 





value along each of the dimensions of the model, but imprecise qualities seem to 
instead correspond to ranges of values along those dimensions.22 
It may be tempting to attempt to solve the problem by simply adding an 
extra dimension (representing degree of precision) to existing models. But such a 
framework would still require assigning individual values along ordinary dimen-
sions (such as hue) to imprecise qualities, would be unable to capture the similarity 
relations between imprecise mental qualities belonging to different quality-spaces, 
and (as we will discuss in the next section) would be unable to accommodate views 
that allow the precision of one dimension (such as hue) to vary independently of the 
precision of other dimensions (such as brightness). To capture precision, we need 
more than just tweaks to existing models; instead, we need structural changes to the 
whole quality-space model framework. 
In light of these problems, some might wonder whether the standard frame-
work was always meant to be an idealization. What if the standard framework was 
never intended to capture all mental qualities? However, there is a paucity of liter-
ature in both philosophy and cognitive science on how to model imprecise qualities, 
and the isomorphism claims frequently advanced in discussions of quality-spaces 
are evidence that the standard framework has been presumed to be representation-
ally adequate. Nevertheless, the principal aim of this paper is to build on existing 
research on modeling mental qualities. Whether or not the regional framework has 
been implicitly assumed, it has certainly not been explicitly developed, and its im-
plications for the structure of experience have not been widely appreciated. 
 
§ 2 | The Regional Framework 
The regional framework models mental qualities using regions, or sets of 
points, rather than just individual points. In what follows, I develop the formal 
structure of the regional framework, address some of the technical challenges, and 
explain why the framework is theoretically fruitful and philosophically significant. 
 
 
22 A further motivation concerns the idea that more precise mental qualities have more spe-
cific contents (in that they eliminate more possibilities). This aspect of precision is not cap-
tured by the standard framework, since every mental quality simply corresponds to a single 
point. By contrast, it will be obvious how the regional framework does better. 





The Basic Formal Structure 
Let us begin by identifying the formal structure of the standard framework 
so that we can see the contrast with the regional framework. Any standard model 
requires a way of representing individual qualities and a way of representing de-
grees of similarity between qualities. In light of this, we can think of standard mod-
els as comprised of a pair of elements: a set 𝒮 of points (representing individual 
qualities) and a distance metric 𝑑 (where greater distances23 represent lower degrees 
of phenomenal similarity).24 
There are three main desiderata when constructing a model in the standard 
framework. First, the points in the model should stand in one-to-one correspond-
ence with the qualities in the target quality-space. Second, points that are more dis-
tant in the model should represent qualities that are less phenomenally similar to 
each other. Third, points should have distance zero just in case the qualities repre-
sented by those points are phenomenally identical. If these constraints are satisfied, 
then the structural properties of the model mirror the structural properties of the 
quality-space. Since standard models cannot capture precision structure, none of 
these desiderata can be fully satisfied. The challenge in what follows is to show that 
the analogous desiderata can be satisfied using the regional framework. 
The regional framework represents experiences using regions, or sets of 
points, rather than individual points. The size of a region inversely corresponds to 
the degree of precision of the quality represented by that region. More specifically: 
mental quality xA is more precise than xB just in case region A (corresponding to xA) 
is smaller than region B (corresponding to xB). There is a question of whether we can 
develop a richer characterization of the relationship between degrees of precision 
and region sizes, such as whether differences or ratios between region sizes corre-
 
23 I assume that a metric is needed to capture relations of phenomenal similarity, though see 
Gert [2017] for an opposing view. Note that this assumption makes the task of developing 
the regional framework harder, since it is unobvious how to develop a metric over regions 
that corresponds to phenomenal similarity. For discussion of how metric structure can be 
extracted from ordinal data, see Beals et al [1968]. 
24 Note that the set	𝒮 of points and metric 𝑑 suffice to determine the dimensionality of the 
space. See Hurevicz & Wallman [1948] on measures of dimensionality. 





spond to differences or ratios between degrees of precision. The answer to this ques-
tion will depend on one’s view about the structure of precision itself: in particular, 
on whether precision has ordinal, interval, or ratio structure.25 I will be neutral on 
this issue in this paper: the regional framework is compatible with any of these 
views about the structure of precision. 
We saw above that standard models can be specified with just a set 𝒮  of 
points and a distance metric 𝑑. The regional framework requires adding more struc-
ture. To specify a regional model, we need not only the set 𝒮 of points and the point-
distance metric 𝑑, but also a set ℛ of regions (meaning a subset of the powerset of 𝒮), a measure	𝜇 on 𝒮, and two metrics on regions which will be formally defined 
later. Over the course of this section, I will explain each of these elements in detail.26 
In the rest of the paper, I will denote regions using small-caps letters (ex: 
region A), perceptible qualities using lowercase letters (ex: perceptible quality a), 
mental qualities using lowercase x with a subscript for the corresponding region (ex: 
mental quality xA), functions using lowercase script letters (ex: the measure 𝜇) and 
elements of the regional framework using uppercase script letters (ex: the set 𝒮of 
points). I will also illustrate regions using diagrams like the one below, where pre-
cision values are denoted using numbers from 0–1 in superscript, with higher num-




25 See Stevens [1946] for discussion of these different measurement scales. 
26 Strictly speaking, specifying a regional model requires specifying only 𝒮, ℛ, 𝑑, and 𝜇. This 
is because the metrics on regions (𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐) can be recovered from 𝑑 and 𝜇. However, 
it will be better for expository purposes to discuss all of the elements of the regional frame-
work in the same way. 
27 The box represents a space, the bounded shapes represent regions, and the regions are 
denoted using the linguistic convention described above. Note that the interpretation of the 
dimensions in the figures is not important. 







FIGURE 1: A pictorial representation of some regions in a regional model. 
  
The rest of this section proceeds as follows: First, I discuss the spaces of re-
gional models, focusing mostly on the set 𝒮 of points and the point-distance metric 𝑑. Second, I discuss the structure of imprecise qualities, focusing mostly on the set ℛ of regions. Third, I discuss similarity with respect to qualitative character versus 
similarity with respect to precision, focusing mostly on the new metrics on regions, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐. Along the way, I explain how the formal framework interacts with a 
variety of philosophical issues concerning the quality-space model framework. 
 
The Structure of the Space 
The space of any given quality-space model is determined by the set 𝒮 of 
points and the point-distance metric 𝑑. Since these are the elements that characterize 
standard models, most of the theoretical issues concerning these elements have al-
ready been addressed in prior work. However, there is one new question concerning 
these elements that arises with the regional framework: namely, whether the spaces 
in regional models should be discrete or continuous. In a discrete space there is a 
finite number of points between any two distinct points; in a continuous space there 
is a continuum of points between any two distinct points. A discrete model would 
enable us to simply “export” all the points of the set 𝒮 of a standard model into a 
B.9 represents a relatively 
precise blue quality.
G.9 represents a relatively 
precise green quality.









regional model.28 In contrast, a continuous model would require a new set 𝒮 that has 
infinitely many points. 
Though discrete models are finite, continuous models are arguably better 
because of their flexibility. A continuous model can capture qualities at arbitrary 
levels of precision, including even qualities with greater precision than the most pre-
cise qualities for human experiences. Furthermore, it is mathematically simpler to 
specify certain kinds of formal constraints on regions in continuous spaces, which is 
an advantage that will be relevant in the next subsection. For these reasons, I will 
assume for the rest of the paper that the models under consideration are continuous 
(though most of the discussion will apply also to discrete models). Note that while 
continuous spaces have infinitely many points, they may still be bounded, in that all 
points lie within a fixed distance from each other. Consider how the interval of real 
numbers from 0 to 1 is continuous but bounded by the limit points 0 and 1. 
In a continuous model, individual points are probably best thought of as 
idealizations: they are the maximally specific values of the dimensions of a quality-
space, even if it turns out that no mental qualities actually correspond to regions 
comprised of a single point. This may raise the worry that regional models have 
more structure than is strictly necessary. However, scientific models often idealize, 
especially when doing so leads to simpler formalisms. For example, suppose that all 
physical objects are composed of particles, that there is a finite set of elementary 
particles, and that all elementary particles have discrete mass values. Then there are 
some mass values that no physical objects could have, since no combination of ele-
mentary particles would generate that mass value. Nevertheless, it may still be use-
ful to represent mass using real numbers (which have continuous structures). By the 
same lights, it may be useful to model mental qualities using continuous spaces even 
if it turns out that points in the spaces are idealizations. 
 
Permissible Regions 
Any regional model must specify the set ℛ of regions, which are subsets of 
the set 𝒮 of points. As we will see, this new element generates new philosophical 
 
28 I assume that standard models must have a finite number of points, since that is needed to 
satisfy the desideratum of one-to-one correspondence between points and qualities (at least 
if we assume that there are finitely many mental qualities for any given quality-space). 





questions about the space and structure of imprecise qualities that are difficult to 
even formulate without the appropriate theoretical resources. 
Why is there a need for ℛ at all? Some might think that we could simply take 
imprecise qualities to be represented by the subsets of 𝒮, avoiding the need to posit 
a whole new set ℛ. However, ℛ is a crucial element in the regional framework, for 
it allows us to distinguish different theories of the structure and space of imprecise 
qualities. As we will see, it may not be the case that every subset of 𝒮 corresponds 
to a possible mental quality. Consequently, we need a way of distinguishing regions, 
which can be any subset of 𝒮, from permissible regions, which are the subsets of 𝒮 that 
are members of ℛ and that are to be interpreted as representing possible mental 
qualities. To put it another way, different specifications of ℛ correspond to different 
theories of the structure and space of imprecise qualities. 
Since there are as many ways of specifying ℛ as there are sets of subsets of 𝒮, it will be useful to focus on formal constraints on ℛ that permit different kinds of 
permissible regions. One class of constraints concerns sizes: what are the minimal 
and maximal sizes of permissible regions? Questions about size constraints corre-
spond to questions about degrees of precision. For example, we might wonder 
whether there could be maximally imprecise qualities whose regions cover entire 
quality-spaces (such as an experience representing something as merely colored) or 
whether there could be super-precise qualities whose regions are arbitrarily small 
(such as an experience representing something as red345.71). For the most part I will 
set aside questions about region sizes, though we will later address how to empiri-
cally investigate the region sizes for particular mental qualities. 
The more interesting class of constraints on ℛ concerns shapes: which kinds 
of shapes can permissible regions take? Questions about shape constraints corre-
spond to questions about the structure of precision. These questions are more diffi-
cult to formulate linguistically, and it will take a bit of space to explain what differ-
ent shape constraints look like and how they correspond to different philosophical 
theories. As examples, we will focus on three different formal constraints on region 
shapes: CONNECTIVITY, CONVEXITY, and UNIFORMITY. Each of these constraints may 
be thought of as a distinct hypothesis about the space and structure of imprecise 
qualities. To get a feel for which kinds of shapes these formal constraints permit or 
exclude, consider the four sample regions in the diagram below: 
 






FIGURE 2: Formal constraints on permissible regions. 
 
The most permissive of the three constraints is CONNECTIVITY, according to 
which all permissible regions are connected.29 A region is connected just in case it has 
no discontinuities, meaning any two points in the region can be connected via a con-
tinuous path of adjacent points that all lie within the region. CONNECTIVITY excludes 
region D from FIGURE 2 but permits regions A, B, and C. More generally, the principle 
rules out mental qualities that represent arbitrary collections of perceptible qualities, 
such as a mental quality that represents something as either crimson or aquamarine 
(but nothing else). However, CONNECTIVITY still permits regions that are rather 
strangely shaped, such as region C. 
This brings us to CONVEXITY, according to which all permissible regions are 
convex.30 A region is convex just in case for every pair of points within the region, 
every point on the straight line-segment that joins the pair of points is also within 
the region. In other words, any region must contain all points within the straight 
lines connecting its boundaries. CONVEXITY excludes regions C and D but permits 
regions A and B. This means that CONVEXITY is more restrictive than CONNECTIVITY 
but still allows irregularly shaped regions, such as region B. 
 
29 FORMAL DEFINITION: if A Î ℛ, then A is not the union of two disjoint open sets of 𝒮, where A 
is open just in case ∀a Î A, ∃ϵ > 0 where the ball B(s, ϵ) = {x Î 𝒮 | 𝑑(x, s) < ϵ} Î 𝒮. 
30 FORMAL DEFINITION: if A Î ℛ, then ∀a, c Î S such that 𝑑(a, c) > 0, A contains all points b Î 𝒮 
such that 𝑑(a, b) + 𝑑(b, c) = 𝑑(a, c). 
CONNECTIVITY permits A, B, C











 The last constraint within our examples is UNIFORMITY, according to which 
all permissible regions are balls.31 A region is a ball just in case it includes all and 
only the set of points that are within a certain distance from a center.32 UNIFORMITY 
excludes regions B, C, and D, permitting only region A, meaning that the principle 
excludes all the irregular regions permitted by the previous constraints. But UNI-
FORMITY also excludes the possibility of mental qualities that differ in their degree 
of imprecision across different dimensions, such as a color experience that is precise 
in hue but imprecise in brightness. This might make some worry that UNIFORMITY 
is too restrictive.33 
The preceding discussion merely scratches the surface. My present aim is 
not to evaluate which of these formal constraints is most plausible, but instead to 
show how the regional framework provides us with tools that enable more rigorous 
and systematic theorizing about the structure of experience. And in doing so, the 
regional framework enables us to formulate interesting hypotheses about the space 
and structure of mental qualities that are hard to express without the appropriate 
framework. Consider how difficult it would be to demarcate these hypotheses or 
even formulate the relevant questions using only natural language. 
 
Qualitative Similarity 
 In the standard framework, it is straightforward to define a point-distance 
metric 𝑑 that represents the similarity relations between different mental qualities. 
By contrast, identifying the right similarity metric in the regional framework is 
much more challenging. For the regional framework, we need a metric that takes as 
input regions of arbitrary size and shape yet still produces outputs that systemati-
cally correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. More specifically, let xA, xB, 
and xC be mental qualities and let A, B, and C be the corresponding regions: if a metric 
 
31 FORMAL DEFINITION: if A Î ℛ, then ∃s Î 𝒮 and 𝜖 > 0 where A = {x Î 𝒮 | 𝑑(x, s) < ϵ}. 
32 In a continuous n-dimensional space, balls are usually bounded by n-dimensional spheres, 
though note that balls near the boundary points of a space may have non-spherical shapes. 
33 There are other natural constraints in between UNIFORMITY and CONVEXITY, such as the con-
straints that all permissible regions are (1) regular polygons or (2) ellipsoids. 





𝑚	is to serve as the similarity metric for the regional framework, it ought to satisfy 
the following constraints:34 
 
(1) if xA is phenomenally identical to xB, then 𝑚(A, B) = 0.  
(2) if xA is more phenomenally similar to xB than to xC, then 𝑚(A, B) > 𝑚(A, C). 
 
 Before addressing candidates for metrics, let me first mention the measure, 
which will be used (alongside the point-distance metric 𝑑) to construct our candi-
dates for metrics on regions. The measure 𝜇 takes as input a subset of 𝒮 and outputs 
a size value.35 Since the size of a region represents its degree of imprecision, 𝜇 can 
be thought of as telling us the degree of imprecision of the mental quality repre-
sented by a region. In discrete models, it is natural to simply take the size of a region 
to be the number of points in the region. However, such a measure does not work 
well in continuous models, since regions in continuous models will typically have 
infinitely many points. Instead, we need the standard mathematical measure: the 
Lebesgue measure, which is a generalization of the notions of length, area, volume, 
and so forth. The mathematical details of the Lebesgue measure are not particularly 
philosophically relevant. What is important is that the Lebesgue measure has the 
properties we would intuitively want a measure to have: in particular, it produces 
intuitive size values in continuous spaces of arbitrary dimensionality.36 With 𝜇 on 
the table, we are in position to examine candidates for metrics on regions. 
A first pass is to turn to the default way of determining distance between 
regions: the least distance function, which takes the distance between regions A and 
 
34 Actually, I will later argue that these constraints ought to be relativized to different kinds 
of phenomenal similarity. But this point does not matter for the moment. 
35 Why is the measure on the set 𝒮 of points rather than the set ℛ of regions? Since a measure 
takes as input a subset of a set, a measure on ℛ would output the sizes of sets of regions 
(rather than the sizes of regions). Consequently, determining the size of a region in ℛ re-
quires measuring the corresponding subset of 𝒮. 
36 See Tao [2011] for a detailed overview of the Lebesgue measure. 





B to be the lowest distance value between any pair of points between A and B.37 How-
ever, suppose that A and B are distinct but overlap (meaning that A and B contain 
some but not all of the same points). Since A and B are distinct, they represent distinct 
qualities, such as phenomenal red and phenomenal reddish-orange. But since A and 
B overlap, there is a point in A that has distance zero to a point in B. As a consequence, 
the least distance function has the result that the distance from A to B is zero. Since 
A and B represent distinct qualities, and since distance zero represents phenomenal 
identity, we have the wrong result. 
A more promising candidate is the average distance function, 𝑎𝑣𝑔, which 
takes the distance between regions A and B to be the average distance from points in 
A to points in B. More specifically, 𝑎𝑣𝑔(A, B) takes a point in A, determines the aver-
age distance between that point and all the points in B, and repeats the procedure 
for every point in A, and then averages the averaged distance values.38 Since the av-
erage distance function is sensitive to all the points in A and B, it is an improvement 
over the least distance function. Yet 𝑎𝑣𝑔 is also inadequate. Consider the average 
distance from any region A to itself. So long as A contains more than one point, there 
will be some pair of points a and b in A where 𝑑(a, b) > 0. As a consequence, the 
average distance from a region to itself must also be non-zero. But non-zero distance 
values represent phenomenally distinct qualities. This means we get the absurd re-
sult that all mental qualities that are not maximally precise are not maximally similar 
to themselves. The source of the problem is that 𝑎𝑣𝑔 does not differentiate between 
points that are shared between regions versus points that belong to only one region. 
When regions are disjoint, 𝑎𝑣𝑔 delivers intuitive results. But when regions overlap, 𝑎𝑣𝑔 runs into problems. We need a new metric that is sensitive to this difference. 
Now we can turn to my proposal, which I call the ‘qualitative similarity met-
ric’, or ‘𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙’. Though 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 might appear somewhat complex at first glance, it is 
 
37 FORMAL DEFINITION: Let 𝑖𝑛𝑓(A) denote the infimum of set A. Then the least distance from A 
to B = 𝑖𝑛𝑓{𝑑(a, b) | a ∈ A, b ∈ B}. 
38 FORMAL DEFINITION: The formal definition of 𝑎𝑣𝑔 differs in discrete vs. continuous spaces. 
For discrete spaces, 𝑎𝑣𝑔(A, B) = ∑ ∑ 𝑑(𝑎, 𝑏) ÷ 𝜇(A)𝜇(B)!∈!#∈" . But since summations over di-
vergent series are undefined, in continuous spaces summation must be replaced with Lebes-
gue integration, where 𝑎𝑣𝑔(A, B) =  ∫ (∫ 𝑑(𝑎, 𝑏)d𝜇(𝑏))d𝜇(𝑎)	%	& ÷ 𝜇(A)𝜇(B). For a more compre-
hensive discussion of these average distance functions, see Fujita [2013]. 





simple and intuitive after getting a feel for how it works. The metric is motivated by 
a simple observation: any case involving overlapping regions can be treated as a 
pair of cases involving disjoint regions. To see how it works, let us begin with an 
example illustrated by the diagram below: 
 
    
FIGURE 3: A overlaps with B (and C), B overlaps with A (and D). 
 
 Suppose we wish to determine the similarity between the mental qualities 
represented by A and B. The 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 metric works by taking the average distance from 
A to the subregion of B that does not overlap with A, the average distance from B to 
the subregion of A that does not overlap with B, and then taking the weighted aver-
age of the two average distances (with the weighting in proportion to the relative 
sizes of A and B). If we apply this procedure to the diagram above, we would first 
find 𝑎𝑣𝑔(A, D), then find 𝑎𝑣𝑔(B, C), and then determine the weighted average of the 
two results. The 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 metric is illustrated pictorially in the diagram below: 
 
 






+×avg A B\A A B\Aµ Aµ A\B×
BA ∪µ
Aavg BA\B





And the metric is expressed formally in the following equation:39 
 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(A, B) =  𝑎𝑣𝑔(A, B\A)	×	𝜇(B\A) + 𝑎𝑣𝑔(B, A\B)	×	𝜇(A\B)	𝜇(A ∪ B)  
 
To verify that 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 produces the right results, we can check the general be-
havior of the metric across cases of identity, disjointness, containment, and overlap 
between regions: IDENTITY: 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(A, B) = 0. This means that whenever two qualities 
are represented by the same region, those qualities are represented as maximally 
similar. DISJOINTNESS: 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(A, B) = 𝑎𝑣𝑔(A, B). This means that 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 collapses to 𝑎𝑣𝑔 
if A and B do not overlap—and as observed above, 𝑎𝑣𝑔 produces intuitively correct 
verdicts in such cases. CONTAINMENT: 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(A, B) > 0. This means that qualities that 
differ in precision are never represented as maximally similar. Moreover—presum-
ing A contains B—increasing the difference in size between A and B also increases 
their distance, meaning that 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 predicts that similarity decreases as the difference 
in precision increases. OVERLAP: 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(A, B) > 0. In fact, the more A and B overlap, the 
lower the distance between them, with the limit of the distance approaching zero as 
degree of overlap tends towards identity. More generally, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 entails that regions 
with points that are more distant are themselves more distant. 
These results are evidence that 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 satisfies the desiderata on a metric out-
lined earlier. This is a significant finding: neither the least distance metric nor the 
average distance metric produced results that plausibly correspond to degrees of 
similarity, and other standard candidates for metrics on regions fare poorly as well.40 
A bonus is that 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 works even in spaces whose dimensions lack ordinal structure. 
This point is important, for any framework for modeling mental qualities must be 
able to accommodate dimensions such as hue or pitch. 
 
39 Why are the numerators 𝜇(B\A) and 𝜇(A\B) rather than simply 𝜇(B) and 𝜇(A)? The reason 
is that this enables 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 to treat overlapping parts of regions differently from disjoint parts 
of regions, avoiding the issues we encountered with 𝑎𝑣𝑔. If the numerators were 𝜇(B) and 𝜇(A), then the function would not entail that 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(A, A) = 0. For more detailed discussion of 
the formal properties of 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙, see Fujita [2013]. 
40 For example, the Hausdorff metric is another standard metric, but its output depends only 
on certain local maxima and minima points, rather than all points in the relevant regions. See 
Rockellar & Wets [2005] for discussion of this metric. 







Nevertheless, there remains an aspect of phenomenal similarity that 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 




FIGURE 5:	𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(B.9, G.9) =  𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(B.9, G.5). 
 
Remember that when regions are disjoint, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 works the same way as 𝑎𝑣𝑔. 
Because of this, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(B.9, G.9) = 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(B.9, G.5), meaning that 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 takes the precise blue 
quality to be as similar to the precise green quality as to the imprecise green quality. 
But B.9 is more similar to G.9 than it is to G.5. After all, B.9 and G.9 are similar with respect 
to precision, whereas B.9 and G.5 are not. Therefore, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 is not directly sensitive to 
the relative sizes of regions. How should we proceed in light of this result? 
My view is that this result is a feature rather than a flaw, for we can now 
formally distinguish two different dimensions of phenomenal similarity. On the one 
hand, two mental qualities might be similar with respect to qualitative character, or 
the aspects of phenomenal character that correspond to phenomenal properties such 
as hue, loudness, and painfulness and that correspond to the dimensions of quality-
space models. On the other hand, two mental qualities might be similar with respect 
to precision, a structural feature of experience that does not correspond to any par-
ticular dimension. It is easy to get an intuitive grip on the difference between these 
kinds of phenomenal similarity. Consider, for example, the difference in kind of sim-
ilarity when comparing a precise phenomenal red quality to a precise phenomenal 
B.9 represents a relatively 
precise blue quality.
G.9 represents a relatively 
precise green quality.









orange quality versus when comparing a precise phenomenal red quality to an im-
precise phenomenal red quality. Our analysis of 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 indicates that it is the right 
metric for qualitative similarity. But it must be supplemented with another metric, 
which I will call ‘𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐’, that measures precision similarity. 
Recall that degree of imprecision is represented by size of region. In light of 
this, a core desideratum for 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 is that the difference in size between regions A and 
B should be greater than that between A and C just in case the precision similarity 
between mental qualities xA and xB is less than that between xA and xC. This criterion 
leads to two natural options for defining 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐: (1) in terms of absolute difference 
(i.e., the absolute value of the difference in size between A and B), or (2) in terms of 
absolute ratio (i.e., the ratio in size between A and B, where the numerator is the size 
of the smaller region). Though both options satisfy the desideratum mentioned 
above, I think the absolute ratio measure is somewhat more plausible. If we were to 
adopt the absolute difference measure, then we would get the result that very pre-
cise mental qualities can differ only marginally in precision similarity (since the ab-
solute difference in sizes between small regions will never be very large). But on the 
contrary, it seems plausible that there can be as much precision dissimilarity be-
tween precise experiences as between imprecise experiences. 
If 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 is a matter of absolute ratio, then it is easy to define (it is also easy to 
define 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 if we instead adopt the absolute difference option). Let 𝑚𝑖𝑛(A, B) be the 
size of the smaller region between A and B and 𝑚𝑎𝑥(A, B) be the size of the larger 
region between A and B. Then we can formally define 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 as follows: 
 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐(A, B) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(A, B)𝑚𝑎𝑥(A, B) 
 
With 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐, we have a solution to the problem from earlier. The situation in-
volved a precise blue experience B.9, a precise green experience G.9, and an imprecise 
green experience G.5. We noted that 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 does not capture the precision similarity 
between the precise blue experience and the precise green experience. But 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 is 





designed to capture this second dimension of similarity (without encroaching on the 
qualitative similarity captured by 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙).41 The result is expressed formally below: 
 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(B.9, G.9) = 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙(B.9, G.5) 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐(B.9, G.9) > 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐(B.9, G.5) 
 
I mentioned previously that the regional framework assumes only that pre-
cision has ordinal structure, whereby we can talk of one precision value being 
greater than another. The fact that 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 appeals to ratios may lead some to wonder 
whether the framework is tacitly assuming that precision furthermore has ratio 
structure, whereby we can talk of ratios between precision values. This is a natural 
worry, but it is off the mark: even those who think that precision has only ordinal 
structure can agree that 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 produces the right verdicts on precision similarity. On 
the current analysis, mental quality xA is more precise than xB just in case region A is 
smaller than B, and the precision similarity between xA and xB is greater than that 
between xA and xC just in case the absolute ratio of A to B is greater than that of A to 
C. The appeal to ratios occurs only on the formal side of these biconditionals: there 
is no talk of ratios between precision values. In other words, while 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 appeals to 
the ratio structure of region sizes to determine degrees of precision similarity, it does 
not ascribe ratio structure to precision itself. As an analogy, consider how even 
though regions in the regional framework are built out of points, imprecise experi-
ences need not themselves be thought of as being built out of precise experiences. 
The separation of 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 may lead some to wonder whether there is 
an overall phenomenal similarity metric that captures phenomenal similarity sim-
pliciter. Speaking for myself, I am skeptical that there is an objective fact of the mat-
ter about how to compare the kinds of phenomenal similarity tracked by 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐. However, the regional framework itself is designed to accommodate a wide 
range of views. For those who think there are such objective facts, we could always 
develop a more general metric that captures both qualitative and precision similar-
ity. For example, a simple method would be to sum the outputs of 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐, 
with a weighting to scale their values relative to each other. However, even if there 
 
41 Strictly speaking, 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 is a pseudometric (rather than a metric) since any metric m must 
satisfy the condition that 𝜇(A, B) = 0 just in case A = B. 





is an objectively correct metric for overall phenomenal similarity, it remains plausi-
ble that 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 track two natural kinds of phenomenal similarity. 
 At this point, some might wonder how it even makes sense to develop a 
formal framework for modeling mental qualities before empirically investigating 
those mental qualities. It is true that in order to determine how particular mental 
qualities map to particular regions within a particular model, we must empirically 
investigate the similarity relations between those mental qualities. But in order to 
construct a model using that empirical data, we need a general framework for map-
ping collections of data to formal structures. In other words, empirical investigation 
of precision requires having a theoretical framework for interpreting those empirical 
results, and developing that theoretical framework requires the kinds of arguments 
I have made in this paper. 
 
§ 3 | Applications 
 In this final section, I explain how the regional framework sheds light on the 
connections between precision and discriminatory grain, how empirical methods 
can be used to construct regional models for particular domains of mental qualities, 
and how the regional framework can be extended to capture probabilistic interpre-
tations of precision. These discussions will be brief, but they will still illustrate some 
of the power and potential of the regional framework. 
 
Discriminatory Grain 
In the quality-space literature, it is standardly taken for granted that we can 
investigate mental qualities via their functional roles. Consider how judgments of 
similarity or distinctness between perceptible qualities are taken to be evidence of 
phenomenal similarity or phenomenal distinctness between the corresponding 
mental qualities. Given this, we might ask whether there is a distinctive functional 
role associated with precision. This section explains and explores the following con-
jecture: precision correlates with discriminatory grain.42 
 
42 See Hellie [2005] and Pelling [2008] for similar philosophical analyses of discriminability 
and imprecise experiences. This section may be thought of as building on this prior work by 
providing a formal treatment of the issues using the resources of the regional framework. 





As a first pass, think of discriminatory grain as the number of discriminations 
a subject can make over a set of physical objects using a particular perceptual capac-
ity.43 If Aya can make 36 discriminations over 50 color chips while Beto can make 
only 9 discriminations over the same 50 color chips, then Aya’s color discrimination 
capacities are more fine-grained than Beto’s. Though this initial gloss elicits the in-
tuitive connection between precision and discriminatory grain, it also raises some 
questions. Suppose a and b are perceptible qualities, that xA and xB are the corre-
sponding mental qualities, and that A and B are the regions for xA and xB. How should 
we think about discriminability when A and B overlap? 
Let us say that a is strongly discriminable from b just in case A is disjoint from 
B, and that a is weakly discriminable from b just in case A partially overlaps with B. If a 
and b are strongly discriminable, then the subject can be sure (taking their experi-
ence at face value) that a is distinct from b. If a and b are only weakly discriminable, 
then the subject cannot be sure (solely on the basis of their experience) whether a 
and b are distinct. Nevertheless, weak discriminability still entails that the way a 
looks is distinct from the way b looks (since A and B are distinct regions and distinct 
regions represent distinct qualities). This distinction between strong and weak dis-
criminability is useful for understanding the sense in which perceptual indiscrimi-
nability is (or is not) transitive. Let us say that a and b are indiscriminable (in either 
sense) just in case they are not discriminable. Then strong indiscriminability is non-
transitive while weak indiscriminability is transitive. 
We can now use the regional framework to formulate a more rigorous meas-
ure of discriminatory grain: the discriminatory grain of a perceptual capacity corre-
sponds to the size of the maximally large set of disjoint permissible regions associ-
ated with that perceptual capacity. Putting it another way, discriminatory grain is a 
maximization of strong discriminations conditional on a minimization (i.e., zero) of 
weak discriminations. In the example from earlier, Aya’s color discriminatory ca-
pacities involve precise color experiences corresponding to relatively small regions, 
meaning that there will be a relatively large maximal set of disjoint permissible re-
 
43 Other factors that may influence discriminatory grain include environment and noise. For 
simplicity, I will assume that measures of discriminatory grain are always relativized to op-
timal environments and factor out (or hold constant) noise. 





gions associated with Aya’s color perception capacities. By contrast, Beto’s color dis-
criminatory capacities involve imprecise color experiences corresponding to rela-
tively large regions, meaning that there will be a relatively small maximal set of dis-
joint permissible regions associated with Beto’s color perception capacities. To pic-
ture this, imagine taking the set of regions associated with a perceptual capacity and 
using those regions to “fill up” the corresponding space with as many regions as 
possible, as illustrated below: 
 
   
FIGURE 6:  A has greater discriminatory grain than B. 
We can apply these connections between precision and discriminability to 
the puzzle of the phenomenal sorites.44 The puzzle concerns cases where a subject 
can discriminate (on the basis of their perceptual experiences) a from b and b from c 
yet cannot discriminate a from c. A natural hypothesis is that phenomenal sorites 
cases involve situations where there is partial overlap between A and B, partial over-
lap between B and C, and non-maximal overlap between A and C. Equivalently, these 
are situations where a and b are not strongly discriminable, b and c are not strongly 
discriminable, and a and c are at least weakly discriminable. In fact, the regional 
framework not only enables us to identify the general conditions for when a phe-
nomenal sorites might occur, but also provides the basis for developing a probabil-
istic model of those conditions. To do that, we need to first define degree of overlap: 
 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝(A, B) = 𝜇(A	 ∩ 	B)½(𝜇(A) + 𝜇(B)) 
 











The 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 function yields a value of 1 just in case A and B are identical and 
a value of 0 just in case A and B are disjoint. With 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝, we can sharpen the con-
jecture that precision is connected to discriminatory grain by developing principles 
connecting degree of overlap between regions to the likelihood of a phenomenal 
sorites case occurring with the experiences represented by those regions. In partic-
ular, let 𝑝(A, B, C) be a function that is intended to capture the probability that the 
subject judges (on the basis of experiences corresponding to regions A, B, and C) that 
a = b and b = c but a ≠ c. Now consider the following principles, which are plausible 
constraints for developing the function 𝑝: 
 
(1) the greater 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝(A, B) and 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝(B, C), the greater 𝑝(A, B, C). 
(2) if either 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝(A, B) = 0 or 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝(B, C) = 0, then p(A, B, C) = 0. 
(3) the greater 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝(A, C), the smaller 𝑝(A, B, C). 
(4) if 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝(A, C) = 1, then p(A, B, C) = 0. 
(5) 0 ≤ p(A, B, C) ≤ 1. 
 
These constraints are all satisfied by the formula below, which uses degree 
of overlap to model the probability that a set of pairwise discriminatory judgments 
(of a, b, and c) based off of mental qualities represented by regions A, B, and C yields 
a phenomenal sorites case: 
 𝑝(A, B, C) ≃	𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝(A, B) × 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝(B, C) × (1 – 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝(A, C)) 
 
The symbol ‘≃’ is intentionally ambiguous, for there is a question of whether 
we must also accommodate other factors that influence perceptual judgments, such 
as epistemic norms, basing abilities, psychophysical noise, and so forth. If we can 
abstract away from such factors to isolate the relationship between precision and 
discriminability, then the formula may capture a linear relationship. If such abstrac-
tions are unfeasible, or if the relationship between precision and discriminability is 
non-linear even after abstraction, then the formula may capture only a monotonic 
relationship. But even in the latter case, the regional framework gives us powerful 
formal tools for understanding the phenomenal sorites (and more generally, the re-
lationship between precision and discriminability). 





A noteworthy result is that even the mental qualities captured by standard 
models are best represented by regions, since phenomenal sorites cases occur even 
for the maximally fine discriminatory capacities of normal humans. This illuminates 
the fact that the regional framework is a general framework for modeling all mental 
qualities, rather than a specialized tool for dealing with a particular kind of mental 
quality. Putting it another way: the regional framework serves as the successor (ra-
ther than merely a supplement) to the standard framework. 
 
Empirical Methodology 
 What kind of methodology is required to construct a regional model for a 
particular domain of mental qualities? Suppose we start with a standard model that 
captures a set of precise mental qualities. The initial step is to convert that standard 
model into a regional model representing those same qualities. This requires map-
ping points in the standard model to regions in the regional model such that (1) 
every point in the former is mapped to a distinct region in the latter, (2) similarity 
relations are preserved, and (3) the boundaries of the space remain the same. The 
basic procedure for this conversion is relatively straightforward, though there is a 
question of how to determine when two regions overlap. Let us set that issue aside 
for the moment—we will return to it soon. 
After converting the standard model to a regional model, the challenge is to 
identify mental qualities that are more imprecise and to map them onto regions, 
with the constraints that distance values (outputted by 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐) correspond 
to degrees of qualitative and precision similarity (between the relevant mental qual-
ities). In other words, for any particular mental quality, we need methods for iden-
tifying its corresponding region’s location, size, and shape. The easiest of these tasks 
is location, for the methodology used to determine locations of points in standard 
models generalizes to determining locations of regions in regional models. Because 
of this, I will focus on region sizes and region shapes. 
To determine the size of a region for a particular mental quality, we need to 
partition perceptual capacities into subclasses, where subclasses are individuated 
by fineness of grain of perceptual discrimination abilities. For example, since color 
discrimination is more coarse-grained outside of the center of the visual field, color 
perception might be divided into subclasses corresponding to angular distance from 
the center of the visual field. More precisely, these subclasses can be individuated 





by distances between just-noticeably different physical stimuli, where two physical 
stimuli that are just-noticeably different for a more fine-grained perceptual capacity 
subclass will be indiscriminable for a more coarse-grained perceptual capacity sub-
class. Then, given our conjecture connecting precision to discriminatory grain, each 
set of just-noticeably different stimuli identified by each perceptual capacity sub-
class will correspond to a set of mental qualities at a different degree of precision. In 
other words, this method enables us to identify different classes of mental qualities 
corresponding to regions of different sizes.45 
The remaining challenge is to devise a method for identifying region shapes. 
In the previous section, we discussed the idea that there are different patterns of 
discrimination for cases involving overlapping versus disjoint regions. In particular, 
disjoint regions should never lead to judgments that two objects are the same, 
whereas overlapping regions should sometimes lead to such judgments, with the 
frequency of such judgments monotonically increasing with the degree of overlap 
between regions. These asymmetries in discrimination patterns provide a way of 
triangulating the shape of a region. 
The most straightforward procedure for identifying region shapes would be 
to induce experiences that involve both an imprecise quality and a precise quality. 
This would require collecting data from subjects making perceptual judgments 
about objects that are perceived using different perceptual capacity subclasses. For 
example, this might require subjects to make perceptual judgments about a color 
chip that they see via foveal vision versus color chips that they see via peripheral 
vision. If the subject judges the chips to be the same color, then that is evidence that 
the region representing the mental quality associated with the fine-grained percep-
tual capacity subclass at least partially overlaps with the region representing the 
mental quality associated with the coarse-grained perceptual capacity subclass. By 
collecting enough data to identify which regions representing precise qualities over-
lap with the region representing the imprecise quality, this method would enable us 
to approximate the region shapes for imprecise mental qualities. 
  
 
45 There are numerous studies in psychophysics that implement this kind of procedure. See, 
for example, Strasburger [2011] on peripheral vision or Bruns et al [2014] on touch. 





From Regions to Fields 
According to what we can call the probabilistic view, precision is associated 
with probabilistic representation.46 I will be neutral on whether the probabilistic 
view is correct, but I will briefly mention how the regional framework can be natu-
rally extended to accommodate it. 
Let me start by explaining the basic structure underlying the probabilistic 
view. Suppose that a subject perceives an object via a color experience, and let p(a) 
be the probability (according to the content of that color quality) that the object has 
color a. On the probabilistic view, it is possible that 𝑝(blue) = .2, 𝑝(teal) = .6, and 𝑝(green) = .2, even when blue, teal, and green correspond to regions of the same size. 
Since these probabilities can vary even when region size is held fixed, the regional 
framework does not have the formal structure needed to model this kind of situa-
tion. The limitation is due to the fact that regions are “flat,” in that they do not assign 
different weights to different points. Speaking more pictorially, the probabilistic 
view takes imprecision to not only have range (which is captured by regions) but 
also depth (which corresponds to the probabilities associated with any given point).  
Nevertheless, the probabilistic view can be accommodated by moving to a 
field framework. A field on a space of points is an assignment of values to every point 
in the space.47 Equivalently, a field is a function from points to values. A region may 
be thought of as a special case of a field, where the region assigns to each point either 
(say) ⊤ (if the point is inside the region) or ⊥	(if the point is outside the region). But 
fields can assign a broader range of values (where a natural constraint for the prob-
abilistic view is that the integral of the field must equal 1). Under the field frame-
work, the precision structure of a mental quality would correspond to the structure 
of the field for that quality. For example, the color quality mentioned above would 
be represented by a field that assigns higher values in the teal region of the quality-
space than in the blue and green regions.48 
 
46 See Morrison [2016] and Munton [2016] for argument in favor of the probabilistic view. See 
Denison [2017] and Nanay [forthcoming] for arguments against. 
47 This notion of ‘field’ should be distinguished from the algebraic notion, where a field is an 
algebraic structure that permits addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. 
48 I suggest fields rather than probability distributions because the relevant probability dis-
tributions would range over perceptible qualities rather than mental qualities. Given this, I 





 As with the regional framework, there are novel challenges in identifying 
which formal constraints on fields are most plausible, in developing the right simi-
larity metrics on fields, and in constructing particular field models. Solving these 
challenges is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is obvious how the regional 
framework provides a basis for developing these more sophisticated formal tools. 
Thus, if the probabilistic view is correct, the evolution of the quality-space model 
framework progresses from points to regions to fields.49 
 
Conclusion 
 A regional model can be specified via a tuple: <𝒮, 𝑑,	ℛ, 𝜇, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙, 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐>, where 𝒮 is a set of points, 𝑑 is the point-distance metric, ℛ is a set of regions (representing 
possible mental qualities), 𝜇 is a measure on 𝒮 (representing degrees of precision), 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 is a metric on regions (representing qualitative similarity), and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐 is a metric 
on regions (representing precision similarity). The structure of the regional frame-
work makes it more powerful and flexible than the standard framework, and ena-
bles us to formulate novel hypotheses about the space and structure of mental qual-
ities, formally differentiate two distinct dimensions of phenomenal similarity, gen-
erate a probabilistic model of the phenomenal sorites, and deploy a new theoretical 
tool in the empirical investigation of consciousness. 
A striking consequence is that the structure of the mental qualities of con-
scious experiences is fundamentally different from the structure of the perceptible 
qualities of external objects. Whereas both mental qualities and perceptible qualities 
have similarity structure, only mental qualities have precision structure. Because of 
this, the isomorphism thesis discussed at the beginning of this paper is false. The 
standard framework remains adequate for modeling perceptible qualities. But cap-
turing the precision structure of mental qualities requires implementing structural 
changes to the entire quality-space model framework. 
 
think it is better to think of mental qualities themselves as modeled by fields, even if their 
contents can be modeled by probability distributions over perceptible qualities. 
49 A more speculative suggestion: the field framework might also be used to model phenom-
enal vivacity (consider the phenomenal contrast between perceptual and imaginative experi-
ences), where more vivid mental qualities would correspond to fields with greater integrals. 





The fact that the isomorphism thesis is false may strike some as puzzling. It 
may be tempting to think that perceptible qualities must have precision structure, 
since perceptible precision may simply be defined as whatever property of percep-
tible qualities corresponds to phenomenal precision. The problem with this line of 
reasoning is that the perceptible correlate of phenomenal precision is determinabil-
ity: imprecise mental qualities correspond to more determinable perceptible quali-
ties. However, mental qualities also have determinability structure, and (as we saw 
in §1) determinability and precision are mutually dissociable. Therefore, the fact that 
there is a perceptible correlate of precision does not vindicate the isomorphism the-
sis. And as far as I can see, there are no other credible candidates for anything play-
ing the role of perceptible precision. Because of this, mental qualities have strictly 
more structure than perceptible qualities. This illustrates, once again, the im-
portance of precision for understanding the structure of conscious experiences. 
For those who will undertake future investigations of mental qualities, there 
is good reason to adopt the regional framework from the outset. By doing so, one 
attains increased power and flexibility with little added cost. Though I focused ear-
lier on how a standard model can be transformed into a regional model, there is no 
methodological advantage to starting with a standard model and subsequently con-
verting it. In fact, the very procedures deployed to construct standard models can 
likewise be deployed to construct regional models. And as we saw earlier, even the 
mental qualities captured by standard models are often better captured by regions, 
since even those mental qualities give rise to phenomenal sorites cases. 
A goal of this paper has been to exhibit the prospects for formal phenome-
nology, or the application of formal tools to the study of conscious experiences. By 
formally modeling conscious experiences, we not only sharpen our understanding 
of how conscious experiences are structured, but also progress our understanding 
of the mind without needing to resolve long-standing theoretical disputes about the 
mind-body problem, the nature of perception, or the physical correlates of con-
sciousness. In my view, this kind of project is one of the most promising ways of 
moving consciousness research towards a systematic science.   
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